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Abstract 
The constant rate discounted utility model is commonly used to represent intertemporal 
preferences in health care program evaluations. This paper examines the appropriateness of 
this model, and argues that the model fails both normatively and descriptively as a 
representation of individual intertemporal preferences for health outcomes. Variable rate 
discounted utility models are more flexible, but still require restrictive assumptions and may 
lead to dynamically inconsistent behaviour. The paper concludes by considering two ways 
of incorporating individual intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluations 
that allow for complementarity of health outcomes in different ime periods. 
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1. Introduction 
Constant rate discounted utility models are commonly used to represent individ- 
ual intertemporal preferences in health care program evaluation. The debate 
mainly centers around the question of what rate of discount o use. Little attention 
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has been paid to the appropriateness of the constant rate discounted utility model 
as such. The axioms underlying the individual preference structure to fit impa- 
tience (Koopmans, 1960), time perspective (Koopmans et al., 1964) and the 
discounted utility model both for a single outcome (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 
1982) and for (infinite) sequences of outcomes (Koopmans, 1972) can be found in 
the economic literature. The general impression from this literature is that the 
discounted utility model t is far from realistic. This impression has been con- 
firmed by empirical studies concerning time preference. These studies display a 
number of anomalies, that are robust and do not require ingenious experimental 
designs to be revealed. 2
This paper examines the appropriateness of the discounted utility model as a 
description of an individual's intertemporal preferences for health outcomes. The 
analysis has immediate relevance for the appropriateness of the use of the 
discounted utility model in the context of economic evaluations where the social 
discount rate is assumed to be based on the aggregate of individuals' intertemporal 
preferences (e.g., Redelmeier and Heller, 1993; Weinstein, 1993). The conditions 
that the model imposes on the individual preference structure are derived and their 
restrictiveness is assessed. Both the case where the preference relation is defined 
over health outcomes and the case where the preference relation is defined over 
lotteries over health outcomes are addressed. We argue that in neither situation 
does the discounted utility model provide a good description of an individual's 
intertemporal preferences for health outcomes. The argument that the discounted 
utility model may not hold descriptively, but should be adopted because of its 
normative appeal will be considered but ultimately rejected. 
It has been argued that the rejection of a constant rate of discount calls for the 
use of a model with a discount rate that is variable (see for example Olsen, 
1993b). By examining the axiomatic structure of the model and by means of an 
example, we show that using a variable rate discounted utility model does not 
solve all problems of the constant rate discounted utility model and creates a 
problem of its own: it may entice the individual to behave in a dynamically 
inconsistent way. 
In this paper we are concerned mainly with individual intertemporal prefer- 
ences for sequences of health outcomes. One might argue that an individual's 
intertemporal preferences are of no interest in health care program evaluations 
given that health care program evaluation should be based on an appropriately 
selected social rate of discount. But when the social discount rate is to be based on 
the aggregate of the individual intertemporal preferences, as has often been 
i From now on discounted utility model will stand for constant-rate discounted utility model unless 
otherwise stated. 
2 See for example Loewenstein (1987, 1988), Loewenstein and Prelee (1991, 1992, 1993), 
Loewenstein and Thaler (1989), and Thaler (1981). For examples ofviolations of the DU model with 
health outcomes see Olsen (1993a), and Redelmeier and Heller (1993). 
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advocated in the case of program evaluation, this argument runs into problems. It 
is not clear why an aggregate concept should satisfy a model that is violated by its 
constituent parts. On the other hand defining the social rate of discount without 
taking into account he individual's intertemporal preferences raises the question - 
what should the foundation of the social rate of discount be.'? It has been argued 
that one should select the appropriate market rate of interest corrected for tax 
distortions. However, correcting for tax distortions is far from straightforward and 
the relationship between the market rate of interest and the social rate of time 
preference is further distorted by the internationalisation of capital markets (Lind, 
1990). Also, ignoring individual intertemporal preferences might be undesirable 
for reasons of consistency. Considerable attention is being given to the develop- 
ment of methods to elicit individuals' preferences for health outcomes. Because 
health outcomes have a time dimension inextricably bound to them, we cannot 
ignore individual intertemporal preferences in valuing them. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the discounted utility 
model when the preference relation is defined over health outcomes under 
certainty. Section 3 derives the discounted utility model when the preference 
relation is defined over lotteries on health outcomes (i.e., under risk). Both 
sections are technical. In Section 4 the axioms underlying the discounted utility 
model are discussed from a normative point of view. Section 5 presents descriptive 
evidence concerning factors affecting individual intertemporal preferences. In 
Section 6 we discuss the argument that a variable rate discounted utility model 
should be used to model individual intertemporal preferences for health. Section 7 
contains concluding remarks and considers two alternative approaches to incorpo- 
rate individual intertemporal preferences in the evaluation of health care programs. 
Proofs of the various results presented in the paper appear in the appendices. 
2. Intertemporal preferences under certainty 
2.1. P re l iminar ies  
This subsection introduces notation and structural assumptions. For more 
details the reader is referred to the appendices. The paper deals with an individual 
decision maker who has a preference relation ~:, meaning "at least as preferred 
as", over a set X of health profiles. A typical element of X is (x l ,x  2 . . . . .  x r) 
where x i denotes health status in period i and T denotes the remaining number of 
years the individual decision maker will live until death. The xi are elements of 
identical one-period sets of health outcomes A. 
We assume the preference relation ~- over X to be a cont inuous  weak order. A 
weak order is (i) complete: the individual decision maker can rank all health 
profiles, and (ii) transitive: if the individual decision maker prefers profile x to 
profile y (x >-y) and profile y to profile z (y >-z), then the individual should 
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also prefer profile x to profile z (x >--z). Strict preference and indifference are 
denoted by ~ and ~ respectively. 
Elements of X, the set of health profiles, are denoted by Roman characters 
x,y, etc. Elements of A, the one period sets of health outcomes, are denoted by 
Greek characters a,/3 etc. Constant alternatives are alternatives that give health 
outcome a in every period, and are denoted by a c. We write x_ i a to denote the 
health profile x with xi replaced by health outcome a. Similarly, x_i.ja, fl 
denotes health profile x with x i replaced by a,  and xj replaced by ft. 
2.2. Preference conditions 
Definition 2.1. The preference relation >- is called coordinate independent 
(CI) if 
(x_ ia)  ~-(y_ ia)  "~ (x ,/3) ~ (y_ i /3 ) fo ra l l  x,y,i,a,[3. 
The idea underlying CI is that if two altematives have an identical health 
outcome in a certain period (have a coordinate in common), then the preference 
between these alternatives hould be unaffected when that common health out- 
come is changed into another common health outcome. CI is also known by other 
names in the literature: e.g., independence (Debreu, 1960; Krantz et al., 1971), 
mutual preferential independence (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
Definition 2.2. The preference relation >- is called cardinally coordinate inde- 
pendent (CCI) if for all x, y, v,w, a,/3,y, 6, j and i, ( x_ i ot ) ~ ( y_ i fl ) and ( x_ i T) 
>" ( Y-i 6 ) and (v_ ja )  ~ (w~/3  ) imply ( v_i T) ~" (w j6 ). 
The intuition behind this condition is as follows. Suppose a is preferred to /3 
and T is preferred to 6. One might say that in period i, the strength of preference 
of a over/3 is smaller than the strength of preference of 3' over 6, since trading 
off/3 for a is not sufficient o compensate for getting x rather than y in all other 
time periods, whereas trading off 6 for T is sufficient. By CCI, if in period j the 
strength of preference of a over/3 is sufficient o compensate for getting v rather 
than w in all other time periods, then trading-off 6 for T is also sufficient. CCI 
establishes that trade-offs between health outcomes are not contradictory in 
different periods. 
Definition 2.3. The preference order ~ is called impatient if 
ac ~ /3c =* ( x-i.i+ la,/3 ) ~" ( x-i.i+ l /3,a ) for alt x,a,[3. 
According to definition 2.3, an individual is impatient if he prefers favourable 
outcomes to occur sooner rather than later. Impatience xcludes the possibility that 
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individuals prefer to postpone favourable outcomes because of the derivation of 
utility from the anticipation of future favourable outcomes. 
Definition 2.4. The preference order ~ is called stationary if, for a constant 
alternative x, there exist health outcomes a and/3 such that for all time periods i: 
( x_, fl ) ~ ( x_ ,+,a ) .  
Stationarity has the effect of making the trade-off between health outcome fl in 
time period i and health outcome a in time period i + 1 invariant with respect o 
what time period i is. The trade-off between health outcomes occurring at 
different points in time depends only on the difference in time of occurrence 
between the health outcomes and not on the exact point in time at which they 
occur. 
We are now ready to state a first theorem. 
Theorem 2.1. The following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) There exists a unique 0 < 7r <_ l, and a continuous function V:A--* •, 
increasing up to positive affine transformations, uch that the individual prefer- 
ence relation >- over the set of  health profiles X can be represented by 
T 
w(x) = E 'v( 
i=1 
(ii) The preference relation >- is a continuous weak order, it satisfies CCI, 
impatience and stationarity. 
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix. 
3. Intertemporal preferences under uncertainty 
A widely held view in health economics is that, since risk is an essential 
element of health decision making, and no appropriate mechanisms exist for 
spreading the risk, individual attitudes towards risk should be incorporated in the 
decision making process both at the individual and group level (e.g., Ben-Zion and 
Gafni, 1983). A way to achieve this, following von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1953), is to define preferences over lotteries over health outcomes rather than 
over the health outcomes themselves. We refer to lotteries over health outcomes as 
risky health outcomes. 
3.1. Preliminaries 
In the context of decision making under risk, the individual preference relation 
>- z is defined over the set Z of simple probability distributions (lotteries) over X. 
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Elements of Z are denoted by capital Roman characters, P, Q, etc. Lotteries over 
A, the set of one period health outcomes, are denoted by P/, Qi, etc. P/and Qi are 
marginal probability distributions. We assume that the preference relation >-z 
satisfies the von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) axioms. These axioms are neces- 
sary and sufficient for the existence of a cardinal, real valued function U: X ~ JR, 
the expectation of which represents >-z. It is important to realize that in vNM 
utility theory Z contains all degenerate probability distributions assigning probabil- 
ity one to an alternative. This induces a preference relation >-- over X. Note that 
U represents >.-. 
3.2. Preference conditions 
In deriving the discounted utility representation, we make maximal use of the 
preference conditions defined in Section 2. An alternative approach would be to 
reformulate these conditions over risky health outcomes rather than over health 
outcomes (e.g. Fishburn, 1970 (section 11.4)). In our opinion defining preference 
conditions over the set of risky health outcomes makes the conditions less 
intuitive. We therefore restrict the use of conditions on the set of risky health 
outcomes to a minimum. However, one assumption on the set of risky health 
outcomes is necessary in order to relate risky health outcomes and health 
outcomes. 
Definition 3.1. The preference relation >- z on Z is called additive independent 
if 
[ P ,a  ~z ,  P i=Q/ for /= I , . . . , T ]  ~ P~ zQ. 
Additive independence asserts that preferences over risky health outcomes 
depend only on the marginal probability of occurrence of each health outcome and 
not on their joint probability distribution. If two probability distributions result, at 
each point in time, in the same probability distribution over health outcomes, then 
by additive independence they should be indifferent. 
Now a second theorem can be given. 
Theorem 3.1. The following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) There exists a unique 0 < ~ < 1, and a continuous vNM utility function 
U:A ---> R,  increasing up to positive affine transformations, uch that the individ- 
ual preference relation >- over health profiles can be represented by 
T 
U( x) = E x,). 
i~l  
(ii) The preference relation >-z over risky alternatives is a weak order, it 
satisfies vNM independence and Jensen continuity and additive independence. 
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Restricted to degenerate probability distributions, >- satisfies CCI, impatience 
and stationarity. 
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix. 
4. A normative assessment of the preference conditions 
Having identified the preference conditions underlying the discounted utility 
model, the question emerges of how appealing are these conditions. This section 
considers whether individuals hould behave according to these preference condi- 
tions. 
Coordinate independence is a strong assumption. It excludes complementarity 
of health states over times. Therefore phenomena such as coping and maximal 
endurable time (Sutherland et al., 1982), that depend on sequences of health states 
cannot be accounted for within the framework of the model. An example may 
clarify how CI excludes complementarity. 
Suppose there are three points in time (three coordinates): i=  1,2,3 and three 
health states: good health (G), mediocre health (M) and poor health (P). Consider 
two choices: A = (MI,G2,G 3) versus B = (GI,M2,G 3) and A' = (M1,G 2,P3) 
versus B' = (G I ,M2,P3) ,  where M; stands for mediocre health in time period i. It 
is conceivable that an individual prefers A to B, because he would rather "get 
over" mediocre health quickly or because he is averse to changes in his health 
status. It is also conceivable that the same individual prefers B' to A', because he 
feels it is easier to cope with P3 when his health decreases gradually over time. A 
preference for A over B and for B' over A' is caused by complementarity of 
health outcomes over time. Both variation aversion and coping relate to sequence 
effects. CI excludes the combination of A preferred to B and B' preferred to A'. 
The two choice situations differ only in the common third coordinate and, since by 
CI common coordinates cannot influence preference it follows that these two 
choice situations are equivalent. 
When the coordinates i are states of the world rather than time points, CI is 
equivalent o Savage's (Savage, 1954) sure thing principle that preferences 
between alternatives should not be influenced by states of nature in which the two 
alternatives have common outcomes, regardless of what those common outcomes 
are. This is exactly what CI implies: common coordinates do not influence the 
preference relation. 
The sure thing principle is theoretically less appealing when coordinates are 
points in time rather than states of nature. The traditional defence of the sure thing 
principle in the context of decision making under uncertainty (e.g. Samuelson, 
1952), that something that never happens should not influence the value of 
something that actually does take place, does not carry over. In the points of time 
interpretation all time periods do occur. 
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It is a common belief in economics that individuals do indeed prefer benefits 
sooner ather than later, which supports impatience. Also, Olson and Bailey (1981) 
provide several normative arguments in defence of impatience. However, impa- 
tience excludes uch effects as anticipation and dread. In the context of health 
decision making it does not seem irrational to prefer unpleasant events to happen 
sooner ather than later. 
Stationarity lacks normative appeal as the time preference literature acknowl- 
edges. For example Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) claim: " . . .we  know of no 
persuasive argument for stationarity as a psychologically viable assumption" (p. 
681). Similar views have been expressed by Koopmans (1960), Koopmans (1972). 
Stationarity requires the passage of time to have no influence on preferences. 
However, if an individual is indifferent between health improvement A now and 
health improvement B with a certain time delay x, why should this individual be 
indifferent between health improvement A in a year's time and health improve- 
ment B at time x + 1 year? 
Finally, additive independence is a strong condition. Additive independence 
excludes any complementarity of health outcomes in different ime periods. For 
example, it requires that an individual is indifferent between two treatment 
scenarios A and B, where A results with probability 0.5 in "living 40 years in 
good health" and with probability 0.5 in "living 40 years in a poor health state 
P"  and B results with probability 0.5 in "first living 20 years in good health 
followed by 20 years in P"  and with probability 0.5 in "first living 20 years in P 
followed by 20 years in good health". In both treatment scenarios, in every year 
the individual has a probability of 0.5 of being in good health and a probability of 
0.5 of living in health state P. Therefore, by additive independence, indifference 
should hold. However, some people could for example prefer treatment A because 
this gives the prospect of living the rest of their lives in good health, while others 
might prefer treatment B because this guarantees living 20 years in good health. 
For a more elaborate discussion of the appropriateness of additive independence in 
health decision making see Maas and Wakker (1994). 
In summary, it appears that no persuasive arguments exist as to why an 
individual should behave according to the discounted utility model. It has been 
suggested by several authors (e.g. Weinstein, 1993) that the discounted utility 
model can be placed normatively on the same footing as the expected utility 
model. However, the translation of the expected utility model to the time context 
reduces the appeal of the underlying axioms and the discounted utility model also 
requires additional, restrictive, axioms. 
5. A descriptive assessment of the preference conditions 
This section considers the descriptive validity of the discounted utility model. 
First, an overview is given of the various factors that have been identified in 
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empirical work as influencing individual intertemporal preferences. Second, direct 
empirical evidence is presented on the appropriateness of the discounted utility 
model in health decision making. 
5.1. A decomposition f intertemporal preference 
Olson and Bailey (1981), following B~hm-Bawerk, identify two "influences" 
which cause an individual to have a positive rate of time preference: decreasing 
marginal utility and pure time preference. Furthermore, they mention the influence 
of uncertainty on intertemporal preferences, but do not predict the sign of this 
effect. Gafni and Torrance (1984) have translated these effects to the case of a 
chronic health state. They identify the following three influences: (i) a quantity 
effect (decreasing marginal utility of health); (ii) a gambling effect, a consequence 
of the presence of uncertainty; and (iii) a pure time preference effect, reflecting the 
fact that individuals prefer to receive benefits ooner ather than later. 
If present, all three of these effects will be properly handled by the discounted 
utility model. Decreasing marginal utility and the individual's attitude towards 
uncertainty are reflected by the shape of the utility function, and the pure time 
preference effect is incorporated in the discount factor. However, the analysis by 
Gafni and Torrance shows that separating these three different effects, which 
seems necessary in order to include them in a credible way in the discounted 
utility model, may prove to be a cumbersome task. 
More recent empirical work 3 suggests that other influences besides the three 
mentioned above affect intertemporal preferences. Individuals generally prefer 
increasing profiles to decreasing profiles that are a permutation of these increasing 
profiles, both for wages (Frank and Hutchens, I993; Loewenstein and Sicherman, 
1991) and for other attributes (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991), contrary to the 
predictions of the discounted utility model. Explanations of this fact distinguish 
sequences from single outcomes. Kahneman and Thaler (1991) identify adaptation 
and loss aversion as important influences on intertemporal preferences for se- 
quences. Adaptation (also called anchoring) refers to the idea that the individual 
tends to consider the normal to be neutral, neither good nor bad. Adaptation is the 
foundation for Scitovsky's (Scitovsky, 1976) distinction between comforts, which 
become noticeable only when they are withdrawn, and pleasures, which are 
noticeable being distinct from the normal. Adaptation plays a central role in 
Loewenstein and Prelec's (1992) model of intertemporal choice. Streams of 
outcomes are evaluated as deviations from a reference vector ather than as being 
incorporated in existing plans. Loss aversion refers to the fact that the value 
function for losses is steeper than for gains. Adaptation in combination with loss 
3 See for example Loewenstein (1987), Loewenstein and Thaler (1989), Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1991, 1992, 1993) and Frank and Hutchens (1993). 
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aversion causes changes in the levels of well-being rather than absolute levels of 
well-being to be the real carders of value for an individual. 
Adaptation and loss-aversion are relevant for preferences over sequences. But 
condition CI, implied by the discounted utility model, excludes complementarity 
of health outcomes over time. Therefore, sequence ffects cannot be incorporated 
in the model. 
Loewenstein (1987) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) present empirical 
evidence on savouring and dread as factors influencing individual intertemporal 
preferences. Savouring refers to the utility experienced through the anticipation of 
future pleasures uch as better health. Dread refers to the disutility experienced 
through the anticipation of future unattractive events uch as poor health. Savour- 
ing and dread are excluded in the discounted utility model by the assumption that 
an individual always prefers to receive positive health benefits ooner ather than 
later (impatience). 
Adaptation, loss-aversion, savouring and dread challenge the discounted utility 
model also in another way, Their existence makes the isolation of the pure time 
preference effect very complicated. Analyses based on the discounted utility model 
need to isolate the pure time preference effect in order to determine the appropri- 
ate discount rate. However, it seems impossible to disentangle the separate 
influences of quantity, uncertainty, pure time preference, adaptation, loss-aversion, 
savouring and dread on individual intertemporal preferences. The discussion about 
the pure rate of time preference resembles the discussion about the concept of 
intrinsic risk attitude (Schoemaker, 1993): the concept is interesting as a theoreti- 
cal construct, but unobservable in reality. 
The confounding of various influences on intertemporal preferences can explain 
the anomalous preference patterns that have been observed with respect to health. 
For example, Redelmeier and Heller (1993) observe that a large proportion of their 
study population effectively applies a negative discount rate but that does not 
necessarily imply a negative pure rate of time preference. It can be explained by 
other influences, because the design used by Redelmeier and Heller (1993) is not 
capable of isolating the pure rate of time preference. Perhaps because health is a 
good with a time dimension inextricably bound to it, no experimental study can 
change the timing of the event without changing other factors, so attempts to 
measure the pure rate of time preference are likely to prove futile. 
5.2. Direct evidence 
Studies that have investigated the predictions of the discounted utility model 
with respect o health decision making have typically rejected the model. Lip- 
scomb (1989) studied preferences over health streams by means of both the 
discounted utility model and a more general strategy (i.e., imposing less restric- 
tions on the individual preference relation) which he refers to as the scenario 
strategy. Lipscomb observed some conflicting predictions, in the sense that the 
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scenario strategy predicted a preference for health profile A over B where the 
discounted utility model predicted a preference for B over A. Since Lipscomb's 
scenario strategy imposes fewer restrictions, it will in general better predict 
choices, and in the case of conflicting predictions the discounted utility model 
seems to lead to the wrong prediction. 
The results of recent empirical studies, attempting to elicit the rate of discount 
individuals apply to health outcomes, cast further doubts on the validity of the 
discounted utility model in modelling individual intertemporal preferences for 
health outcomes. The studies by Redelmeier and Heller (1993), Olsen (1993a), 
Mackeigan et al. (1993) and Cairns (1994) all reject the constant rate discounted 
utility model for the time preferences of such diverse groups as students, physi- 
cians, health policy makers and members of the general public. The pattern that 
emerges from these studies is a high discount rate for more proximate years and a 
lower discount rate for more distant years. 
6. Variable rate discounted utility models 
Given the deficiencies of the constant rate discounted utility model, Otsen 
(1993a) and Harvey (1994) among others, have suggested replacing the constant 
rate discounted utility (CRDU) model by a variable rate discounted utility (VRDU) 
mOdel. The axiomatization of the VRDU model follows readily from the analyses 
of Sections 2 and 3. In the context of Section 2, condition CCI in addition to the 
structural assumptions i  sufficient to obtain a general VRDU model. In the 
context of Section 3, additive independence has to be imposed as well. VRDU 
models are more general than the constant rate discounted utility model. Stationar- 
ity is no longer imposed, and therefore intertemporal trade-offs no longer need to 
be invariant with respect o the passage of time. Impatience does not need to be 
imposed, unless the discount function is to be a decreasing function of time. 
Because VRDU models make fewer assumptions with respect o individual 
preferences, they are better able to predict observable data. However, such 
required conditions as additive independence are still strong as has been argued in 
Sections 4 and 5. Since CCI implies CI, sequence ffects are still excluded. 
Finally, like its constant rate counterpart, the variable rate discounted utility model 
needs information on the pure rate of time preference, information that may be 
difficult to retrieve. 
An individual whose preferences satisfy a VRDU model at any point in time 
faces another problem: varying discount rates may lead to dynamically inconsis- 
tent preferences (Strotz, 1956; Hammond, 1976). Suppose an individual must 
choose between two scenarios both involving three periods. Scenario A yields the 
sequence of health benefits (0.8, 0.6, 0.4), and scenario B yields the sequence (0.8, 
0.4, 0.61). Suppose that the individual is a variable rate discounted utility 
maximizer at any time period. Assume that the discount rate for the first period is 
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0%, that the discount rate for the second period is 10% and for the third period 
4%. It is easily checked that a VRDU maximizer will prefer scenario B, 
Suppose the individual reconsiders his choice after the first period. Suppose 
further that the individual can switch programs at a certain cost. Since benefits in 
the first period are equal in the two scenarios, the individual can concentrate on 
the future benefits of the two programs. Recalculating his discounted utility, the 
individual does not discount the benefits occurring in (what was) the second 
period and applies the discount rate of 10% to the benefits occurring in (what was) 
the third period. The individual will now prefer scenario A and will pay any 
amount up to the sum of money which is equivalent to the utility difference 
between the two programs to be able to switch. Similar examples involving more 
than three periods can be constructed, in which the individual will pay an amount 
of money every period to be able to switch scenarios, only to end up in the 
scenario he already preferred in the first period, but not after having lost a good 
deal of money. 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that the discounted utility model is inappropriate in modelling 
individual intertemporal preferences, both for certain health outcomes and for 
uncertain health outcomes. First, the axiom system of the discounted utility model 
is restrictive. Second, information about the individual pure rates of time prefer- 
ence for health, which is necessary for the discounted utility model, is unlikely to 
be retrievable. There is an additional problem in discounting health outcomes: the 
possibility of double discounting (Krahn and Gafni, 1993; Gafni, 1994). Since 
health outcomes cannot be defined without reference to time duration, and utility 
assessment procedures typically introduce a time dimension (Torrance, 1986; 
Torrance and Feeny, 1989), individuals may incorporate their time preferences at 
least to some extent in the assessment of the utility of various health outcomes. 
Fully discounting health outcomes in such a situation would not be appropriate. 
Where do these negative conclusions lead? One possibility is to relax the 
preference conditions underlying the discounted utility model to take individual 
intertemporal preferences for health outcomes into account in a more realistic way 
in health care program evaluation. On the other hand, relaxing preference condi- 
tions necessarily implies assessing more parameters. At every stage, the trade off 
between theoretical soundness and practical feasibility has to be made. 
The VRDU model does relax the preference conditions of the CRDU model. 
However, the VRDU model still does not allow complementarity between time 
periods, which is possibly the most restrictive assumption of the CRDU model. 
Complementarity between times can be introduced in the model by following one 
of two approaches. One possibility is to extend the utility function by incorporat- 
ing factors like habit formation (Pollak, 1970; Constantinides, 1990), the rate of 
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benefit change (Frank and Hutchens, 1993) or preference/aversion for utility 
variation between adjacent periods (Gilboa, 1989). Gilboa's model is an attempt to 
apply the Choquet expected utility models, which have been successful in decision 
making under uncertainty, to the time context. In the model where preferences 
concern risky health outcomes, preferences for health outcomes can be made to 
depend on the joint probability distribution, albeit in a limited sense, by relaxing 
additive independence to mutual utility independence. Miyamoto and Eraker 
(1988) have found that utility independence g nerally holds in the health context. 
Alternatively, the utility of health scenarios can be assessed directly by 
evaluating the whole stream of health outcomes. By not evaluating health out- 
comes separately, this approach in fact rejects coordinate independence. This is the 
idea behind Lipscomb's cenario strategy as well as the HYE (Gafni, 1995). A 
disadvantage of scenario-based measures i that their "refusal" to evaluate health 
outcomes eparately excludes the evaluation of health scenarios by short cuts. 
Whereas approaches based on coordinate independence n ed only assess a limited 
number of health states, in a scenario strategy every scenario must be assessed 
separately. This might limit their applicability in complex medical decision 
problems involving many possible health outcomes. 
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Appendix A. Proof of theorem 2.1 
A.1. Mathematical structure 
The set of alternatives, X, is assumed to be a Cartesian product of the identical 
one period sets A: X = A r. Time periods i are elements of a finite index set 
I = {1 . . . . .  T} with T e I%1. The following structural assumptions are made with 
respect o A and X: (i) A is a connected and separable topological space; 4 (i) X 
is endowed with the product opology. Connectedness ensures that every continu- 
ous function from X to I~ has an interval as its image, so that this image has no 
4 In fact topological separability does not have to be assumed if more than one time period is 
essential (Krantz et al., 1971 (section 6.11. I); Vind, 1990; Wakker, 1989 (Remark III.7.1)). 
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holes. The weak order >- defined on X is taken as primitive. A weak order ~- is 
complete (x >- y or y >-- x for all x,y ~ X) and transitive (if x >- y and y >- z then 
x ~ z). This implies that the indifference relation ,-,, defined as both x ~ y and 
y ~ x, is an equivalence, i.e. it is symmetric (x ~ y ¢* y "- x), reflexive (x ~ x) 
and transitive). Strict preference x >.-y is defined as x >-y and not y >-x. We 
assume that ~- is continuous: {x:x>-y} and {x:x-< y) are closed for all yeX. 
Continuity of the preference relation ensures that, if a function W exists that 
represents the preference relation, i.e. W: X ~ R satisfies x >- y ,~ W(x) > W(y), 
then this function makes no jumps. The topological assumptions and the assump- 
tion that >- is a continuous weak order are necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a continuous representing function W:X--* R (Debreu, 1954). 
We assume that there are at least two time periods and that every time period is 
essential, i.e. x ,  a >- x_,./3 for some health outcomes t~ and /3 e A and for all i. 
A.2. Proof of theorem 2.1 
That (i) implies (ii) is straightforward. Hence we assume that (ii) holds and 
derive (i). 
Definition AI.I. The preference order >- is called persistent if 
( x_~a ) ~ ( x_ i fl ) ¢* ( y_ ja  ) >- ( y_j/3 ) forall x ,y ,a , /3 , i , j .  
Persistence of the preference order asserts that preferences for health outcomes 
are identical in every time period. Persistence excludes to some extent a preference 
for variety. This can be seen for example by setting all elements of y in the above 
definition equal to a. 
Persistence is implied by CCI. Set x = y, v = w, a =/3. By reflexivity of ~ • 
X_iOl ~" X_iOl and v_ ja ~ v_jot. So X_iOl "~ .X_iOl and v_jot >-v_ja both 
hold. Now v_jT ~- v j~ follows from CCI. 
By the structural assumptions being made, by CCI and by lemma IV.2.5 in 
Wakker (1989), we know from theorem IV.2.7 in Wakker (1989) that the 
preference relation can be represented by x ~ y ¢* ~A~V( xi) ~ ~,AiV( x i) with the 
A i uniquely determined and V continuous and unique up to positive linear 
transformations. 
As shown above, CCI ~* persistence. By persistence we cannot have x_ i a ~- 
x_,./3 and x_jot .< x_jf l .  Thus we cannot have 
+ > + 
k~i k~i 
and 
Ea,v (x , )  + < Ex,v (x , )  + xjv(13). 
l~j  l,~j 
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From this it follows that either all Aj's are positive or all Aj's are negative. If 
all A's are negative, replace V by -V  and Aj by -Aj .  So all Aj's are positive. 
Then it automatically follows that if a~ >-/3~ then V(a)  >_ V(f l ) .  By impatience 
if oe¢ >-/3~ then x_ i , i+ lOL , /3>-x_ i . i+ l  [~,ol. So 
g 
k4, i,i+ 1 
g + A,v(/3) 
k~ i,i+ I 
- _ - 
Thus A i_> Ai+l. Set Aj = 1. 
Now by stationarity 
(z- i~3) ~ ( z - i+ta) fora l l  i,i + 1. 
The existence of such a z follows from restricted solvability, which by lemma 
III.3.3 in Wakker (1989) is implied by the topological assumptions and by ~- 
being a continuous weak order. Restricted solvability asserts that for every 
x ia >- y >- x_ iy  there exists /3 such that x_i/3 ~ y. Take y = z-i+ ~a, z = x and 
select some Yc such that ac >-/3 cz.- %. 
Because V is unique up to positive linear transformations, we can set V(Z) 
equal to zero. Following from the assumption that all time periods are essential, 
there exist oe and /3 such that V(a),  V( f l )  > 0. Now from stationarity (z_~ /3) 
~ (z-2 a)  =* V(/3) = A2V(a) =~ A 2 = V(/3) /V(ct ) .  Apply stationarity again to 
get (z -2 /3)  ~ (z-3 a )  =* A2V(/3) = A3V(a) ~ A3 = A2[V( f l ) /V(a) ]  =~ "~3 :" 
[V(/3)/V(ot)]  2. Set 7r= [V ( f l ) /V (a ) ] .  Then the constant discount rate model 
follows. Since by impatience 7r < A~ = 1 and every Aj > 0 as established above, 
0<Tr< 1. 
Appendix B. Proof of theorem 3.1 
B.1. Mathematical structure 
Z is defined as the set of all simple probability measures on X. A simple 
probability measure on X is a real-valued function P defined on the set of all 
subsets of X such that: (i) P(B)> 0 for every BGX;  (ii) P (X)= 1; (iii) 
P(BUC)=P(B)+P(C)  when B,CGX and BAC=O;  (iv) P (B)=I  for 
some finite B cX .  A typical element of Z is denoted by (p l ,x~; . . . ;p" ,x" )  
where, for each j, alternative xj results with probability pJ and m can be any 
natural number. Elements of Z are denoted by capital Roman characters P,Q etc. 
Since Z contains many simple probability distributions, risky health outcomes can 
be mixed, or more formal, Z is closed under convex combinations: if P,Q ~ Z 
and A E [0,1] then AP + (1 - A) Q E Z, where AP + (1 - A)Q is the lottery 
(hp  ~ + (1 - h )q~,x l ; . . . ;hp  '~+ (1 - h)q'~,xm). 
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The preference relation >-z is defined on Z. >'z is assumed to be a weak 
order. Furthermore, we impose the following two axioms (Jensen, 1967): 
1. vNM independence: (P >- zQ, 0 < ,o. < 1) ,~, (/xP + (1 - p.)R) >- :(/xQ + (1 
- / z )R)  for all P,Q,R ~ Z 
2. Jensen continuity: (P  >- Q, Q >- R) =*/xe + (1 - ~)R >- ,Q and Q >-~ pP + (1 
- p)R for some /x,p e (0,1). 
vNM independence is widely regarded to be the core of expected utility theory. 
It says that if P is weakly preferred to Q then any convex combination of P and 
R should be weakly preferred to a similar convex combination of Q and R. Jensen 
continuity is an Archimedean condition, which asserts that, for P >-, Q >- z R, there 
are values /z and p such that the convex combination of P and R is preferred to 
Q respectively Q is preferred to the convex combination of P and R. 
Define Y as the set of simple probability distributions on the one period sets of 
health outcomes A. A marginal probability measure Pi is defined on A as: if 
B cA ,  then P~(B) = P(X:x~ e B). A preference relation ;,- is defined on Y from 
~- on Z in the following way: 
R >- zS•P  >- ,Q forP ,QEZand R ,S~ Y, such that 
P /= R and Qi = S for all time points i and P assigns probability one to a 
constant x. 
B.2. Proof of theorem 3.1 
(i) ~ (ii) is again straightforward. Hence, assume (ii). To derive is (i). 
Because both W= E'rr i- ~V(x i) and U represent a preference relation >- over 
X, they are related by a strictly increasing transformation. Under the assumptions 
of Section 2, W is a continuous additive representation f >- over X. Now, if U 
can also be written as a continuous additive representation of >-, then, by 
cardinality of V and U, U is a linear transform of V and can be taken identical to 
V. By additive independence U(x)= S, iU~(x~) (this result has been proved by 
Fishburn (1965)). By theorem 3.2 in Maas and Wakker (1994), U is continuous. 
Thus, U can be set equal to W: U(x) = S,~Vi(x~). Then apply the proof of theorem 
2.1. This gives the desired result. 
References 
Ben-Zion, U. and A. Gafni, 1983, Evaluation of public investment in health care: Is the risk irrelevant?, 
Journal of Health Economics 2, 161-165. 
Cairns, J., 1994, Valuing future benefits, Health Economics 3, 221-229. 
Constantinides, G.M., 1990, Habit formation: A resolution of the equity premium puzzle, Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 519-543. 
Debreu, G., 1954, Representation f preference ordering by a numerical function, in: R.M Thrall, C.H. 
Coombs and R.L. Davids, eds., Decision processes (Wiley, New York), 159-165. 
H. Bleichrodt, A. Gafni /Journal of Health Economics 15 (1996)49-66 65 
Debreu, G., 1960, Topological methods in cardinal utility theory, Ch. 2 in: K.J. Arrow, S. Karlin and P. 
Suppes, eds., Mathematical methods in the social sciences (Stanford University Press) 16-26. 
Fishburn, P.C., 1965, Independence in utility theory with whole product sets, Operations Research 13, 
28 -45. 
Fishburn, P.C., 1970, Utility theory for decision making (Wiley, New York). 
Fishbum, P.C. and A. Rubinstein, 1982, Time preference, International Economic Review 23, 
677-694. 
Frank, R. and R. Hutchens, 1993, Wages, seniority, and the demand for rising consumption profiles, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2t, 251-276. 
Gafni, A., 1994, The standard gamble method: What is being measured and how it is interpreted. 
Health Services Research 29, 207-224. 
Gafni, A., 1995, Time in health: Can we measure individual's pure time preference?, Medical Decision 
Making 15, 31-37. 
Gafni, A. and G.W. Torrance, 1984, Risk attitude and time preference in health, Management Science 
30, 440-451. 
Gilboa, 1., 1989, Expectation and variation in multi-period ecisions, Econometrica 57, 1153-1169. 
Hammond, P., 1976, Changing tastes and coherent dynamic hoice, Review of Economic Studies 43, 
159-173. 
Harvey, C.M., 1994, The reasonableness of non-constant discounting, Journal of Public Economics 53, 
31-51. 
Jensen, N.E., 1967, An introduction to Bemoullian utility theory: I. Utility functions, Swedish Journal 
of Economics 69, 163-183. 
Kahneman, D. and R. q-haler, 1991, Economic analysis and the psychology of utility: Applications to 
compensation policy, American Economic Review Proceedings 81,341-346. 
Keeney, R.L. and H. Raiffa, 1976, Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and value tradeoffs 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). 
Koopmans, T.C., 1960, Stationary ordinal utility and impatience, Econometrica 28, 287-309. 
Koopmans, T.C., 1972, Representation f preference orderings over time, Ch. 4 in: C.B. McGuire and 
R. Radner, eds., Decision and organization: A volume in honor of Jacob Marschak (North Holland, 
Amsterdam) 79-100. 
Koopmans, T.C., P.A. Diamond and R.E. Williamson, 1964, Stationary utility and time perspective, 
Econometrica 32, 82-100. 
Krahn, M. and A. Gafni, 1993, Discounting in the economic evaluation of health care interventions, 
Medical Care 31,403-418. 
Krantz, D.H., R.D. Luce, P. Suppes and A. Tversky, 1971, Foundations of measurement, Vol. 1: 
Additive and polynomial representations (Academic Press, New York). 
Lind, R.C., 1990, Reassessing the government's di count rate policy in the light of new theory and data 
in a world economy with a high degree of capital mobility, Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management t8, $8-28. 
Lipscomb, J., 1989, Time preference for health in cost-effectiveness analysis, Medical Care 27, 
$233-$253. 
Loewenstein, G., 1987, Anticipation and the value of delayed consumption, Economic Journal 97, 
666-684. 
Loewenstein, G., 1988, Frames of mind in intertemporal choice, Management Science 34, 200-214. 
Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec, 1991, Negative time preference, American Economic Review Proceed- 
ings 81,347-352. 
Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec, 1992, Anomalies in intertemporal choice: Evidence and an interpreta- 
tion, Quarterly Joumal of Economics 107, 573-597. 
Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec, 1993, Preferences for sequences of outcomes, Psychological Review 
100, 91-108. 
66 H. Bleichrodt, A. Gafni / Journal of Health Economics 15 (1996) 49-66 
Loewenstein, G. and N. Sicherman, 1991, Do workers prefer increasing wage profiles?, Journal of 
Labor Economics. 
Loewenstein, G. and R. Thaler, 1989, Anomalies: Intertemporal choice, Journal of Economic Perspec- 
tives 3, 181-193. 
Maas, A. and P.P. Wakker, 1994, Additive conjoint measurement for multiattribute utility, Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology 38, 86-101. 
Mackeigan, L.D., L.N. Lawson, J.R. Drangalis, J.L. Bootman and L.R. Bums, 1993, Time preference 
for health gains versus health losses, Pharmaco Economics 3, 374-386. 
Miyamoto, J.M. and S.A. Eraker, 1988, A multiplicative model of the utility of survival duration and 
health quality, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 117, 3-20. 
Olsen, J.A., 1993a, Time preference for health gains: An empirical investigation, Health Economics 2, 
257-265. 
Olsen, J.A., 1993b, On what basis should health be discounted, Journal of Health Economics 12, 
39-53. 
Olson, M. and M.J. Bailey, 1981, Positive time preference, Journal of Political Economy 89, 1-25. 
Pollak, R.A., 1970, Habit formation and dynamic demand functions, Journal of Political Economy 78, 
745-763. 
Redelmeier, D.A. and D.N. Heller, 1993, Time preference in medical decision making and cost 
effectiveness analysis, Medical Decision Making 13, 212-217. 
Savage, L.J., 1954, The foundations of statistics (Wiley, New York). 
Samuelson, P.A., 1952, Probability, utility and the independence axiom, Econometrica 20, 670-678. 
Schoemaker, P.J.H., 1993, Determinants of risk-taking: Behavioral and economic views, Joumal of 
Risk and Uncertainty 6, 49-73. 
Scitovsky, T., 1976, The joyless economy (Oxford University Press). 
Strotz, R.H., 1956, Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization, Review of Economic 
Studies 23, 165-180. 
Sutherland, H.J., H. Llewellyn-Thomas, N.F. Boyd and J.E. Till, 1982, Attitudes toward quality of 
survival: The concept of "maximal endurable time", Medical Decision Making 2, 299-309. 
Thaler, R., 1981, Some empirical evidence on dynamic onsistency, Economic Letters 8, 201-207. 
Torrance, G.W., 1986, Measurement of health state utilities for economic appraisal, Journal of Health 
Economics 5, 1-30. 
Torrance, G.W. and D. Feeny, 1989, Utilities and quality adjusted life-years, Intemational Journal of 
Technology Assessment in Health Care 8, 559-578. 
Vind, K., 1990, Additive utility functions and other special functions in economic theory, Discussion 
paper 90-21, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 
von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstem, 1953, Theory of games and economic behaviour, 3rd edn. 
(Wiley, New York). 
Wakker, P.P., 1989, Additive representations of preferences: A new foundation of decision analysis 
(Kluwer, Dordrech0. 
Weinstein, M.C., 1993, Time-preference studies in the health care context, Medical Decision Making, 
218-219. 
